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Warwick Fox’s recent attempt to lay the foundations of a transpersonal ecolo-
gy raises the question of whether the problem of self-identification is the right
starting point for addressing the ecological crisis. By framing a transpersonal
ecology in terms of three possible levels of self-identification (personal, ontologi-
cal, and cosmological) Fox addresses a fundamental problem in the evolution of
Western consciousness; namely, how to reestablish a deep sense of connectedness
of the individual with the entities and life sustaining patterns that make up the
natural world. Fox’s ideal of a cosmological level of self-identification, where
the sense of self is expanded through the deep awareness that all forms of life
are interdependent participants in a “single unfolding reality,” would resolve the
problem of Western dualism by eliminating the individual as the epicenter of
distinct worth and rational judgment. His formulation both of the problem and
the solution (that is, that individuals have a choice in the critically important
matter of self-identification and that scientific evidence now strongly supports
a cosmological sense of being) seem to be a culturally conditioned argument.
To put the problem differently, Fox’s focus on the individual as the starting
point in dealing with the human aspects of the ecological crisis leaves out of
the discussion the primacy and formative influence of culture. In effect, Fox’s
analysis of the conceptual baggage now associated with “deep ecology” and his
arguments about advantages and disadvantages of the personal and ontological
levels of self-identification reflect the Western cultural tradition of representing
identity as a matter of individual choice. The intention behind his analysis,
along with the appeal to consider the evidence of science, is to affect how in-
dividuals elect to constitute their own sense of self-identity. In Irene Bloom’s
fascinating paper, “On the Matter of Mind: The Metaphysical Basis of the
Expanded Self,” she notes that “in classical China, where persons were charac-
teristically defined in terms of biological inheritance, identities and roles were
not chosen but received along with the gift of life itself.” 1 Her point is that cul-
ture (in this case, Confucian culture with its emphasis on the relational aspects
of human existence) constitutes not only how persons will understand them-
selves, but also will privilege the development of attributes most essential to
the expression of the cultural view of identity. A culture that stresses relation-
al patterns will reinforce distinctive capacities associated with communication:
respectful listening, rectified speaking, mindful use of the body as part of the
message system, memory of the analogues upon which everyday life are to be
based, and so forth. A culture that stresses the individual as the basic social
unit, and thus as the primary agent of decision making, will reinforce attributes
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associated with empirical observation, critical reflection, use of individually for-
mulated ideas and values as the basis of action, and, at the deepest level, a
sense of being comfortable with a highly experimental life style. Even the ki-
nesic patterns that make the body such an important part of communication
will be different.
The individually centered culture, as we can see, involves a double bind that
does not characterize cultures that make themselves visible to their members
through the authority of their traditions. For Western cultures (and theorists)
that uphold the primacy of the individual, even when attempting to reconstitute
it on a new basis, the rational approach continues to reinforce cultural patterns
that frame culture out of the picture. Thus, Fox is not the only theorist caught
in this double bind. My own attempt here to use the printed word as a means
of influencing the reader to reflect on a different set of issues, and hopefully to
choose to think and act in more ecologically responsive ways, serves to amplify
cultural patterns that reinforce the invisibility of culture.
In the broadest sense, the question being posed here has to do with whether
the rational process used to analyze both the causes and possible solutions to
the ecological crisis is as efficacious in changing cultural patterns as many of
us want to think it is. In suggesting that a viable approach to a transpersonal
ecology must take account of the primacy of culture, I am aware that I am not
escaping the problem Fox never quite comes to terms with: namely, how to
move from a rational argument for a transpersonal ecology to affecting actual
changes in cultural practices. Broadening the discussion may open up other
pathways that can be explored, as well as help illuminate how our currently
rooted cultural biases undermine our ability to learn from cultures that have
evolved ecologically sustainable patterns. In effect, the challenge here is to
suggest how Fox’s rationalistic formulation can be expanded to take account
of the constitutive role that culture plays in forming and sustaining patterns
of human consciousness. While the word “culture” can be stretched to cover
the entire range of human activity, and even be understood as interactive with
the natural world, I shall restrict the discussion here to three aspects of culture
that seem essential to an expanded understanding of a transpersonal ecology.
These include the nature of cultural storage and reproduction, ideology, and the
“reality” constituting and sustaining nature of semiosis.
In traditional cultures like that of the Hopi and Balinese the processes asso-
ciated with storage, semiosis, and ideology cannot be separated from religion,
myth, ceremony, technological practice, attitudes toward nature, and so on. The
cosmology, as experienced by these cultural groups, is a seamless whole. But
the audience Fox is addressing lives in a more fragmented culture; it is also one
that has built up a set of guiding beliefs that now serve as the canon for the
modern and progressive thinker. The terrible dilemma created by this canon
is that challenging it often leads to being labelled a “reactionary thinker,” but
continuing to use it as the basis of personal/cultural life further undermines
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the viability of the environment. By addressing the specific aspects of culture
associated with cultural storage, semiosis, and ideology we can get a better idea
of the cultural implications of Fox’s proposals and a clearer sense of the leverage
points for affecting change. Again, it must be emphasized that the three aspects
of culture being addressed here involve the use of a metaphorical language that
illuminates distinctive characteristics of the symbolic world of a cultural group,
and hides others that seem less critical. Cultural storage is sustained by the
processes of semiosis; and ideology both influences the codification of signs and
the forms of knowledge that will be valued (and thus the forms of knowledge
that will be devalued and lost). All three are aspects of a living mental ecology
that remains largely hidden from the horizon of explicit awareness, but contin-
ues to guide human thought and behavior at the taken for granted level that
characterizes most cultural knowledge.
Cultural Storage
Cultural storage can best be understood in terms of Edward Shils’ use of the
word “tradition,” which, according to his definition, is anything handed down
from the past to the present. To quote him, “tradition is whatever is persistent
or recurrent through transmission, regardless of the substance or institutional
settings.” 2 While some traditions may be more enduring than others, and
even be sustained by people long after they have ceased being viable, traditions
represent all the ways in which knowledge has been encoded in social practices,
technologies, and ways of thinking and communicating. These include conven-
tions that govern human practices that range from body language, the design
of buildings and the layout of streets, to the metaphorical constructions of lan-
guage. In a short, tradition is the historical dimension of the mental ecology
we refer to as culture. What is particularly germane to Fox’s arguments for
changing the basis of self-identification is that the mental/cultural processes of
the past, and now encoded in the multiple forms of communication that char-
acterize a culture, exist prior to the individual’s entrance into the world. As
infants learn the languages of the cultural group (the language of music, the
use of the body as a powerful form of metacommunication, spoken and written
discourse, architecture, and so forth) they become socialized to the schemata of
mostly tacit understandings that enable them to act, think, and communicate
with other members of the cultural group.
These patterns or schemata serve as the initial basis for how the infant will
make sense of the world, and they have particular relevance for Fox’s way of
framing the process of self-identification. The primacy of the cultural group’s
symbolic maps, which may or may not be useful guides for making sense of the
territory of the human/environment relationship, can be seen in Alasdair Mac-
Intyre’s account of how the personal identity is framed by the shared narratives
of the group. The key question for humans, he writes, “is not about their own
authorship. I can only answer the question ‘What am I to do?’ if I can answer
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the prior question ‘Of what story or stories do I find myself part of?” 3 But as
the vocabulary necessary for articulating the problematic aspects of self-identity
may not be made available by the keepers of the narratives, the ability to con-
stitute a new self separate from the narrativized communal images of self may
not exist. That the individual has a choice in the matter of self-identification
may not be part of the reality constituting narratives of the group. Fox’s formu-
lation of a transpersonal ecology, as beginning with the rational judgment of the
individual, can be seen as problematic when we consider the identity formation
process in cultures that do not have an anthropocentric orientation. Should
we follow Fox’s lead by urging that the members of Hopi and Balinese cultures
(two cultures that have worked out the human/habitat relationship in a manner
that has proven sustainable over the long term–which is the ultimate test of a
successful culture) decide their own basis for cosmological self–identification?
As I read Fox, the Hopi or Balinese individual might even choose to base it
on scientific evidence, which Fox claims is “equal to any mythical, religious, or
speculative philosophical account in terms of the scale, grandeur, and richness
of detail.” 4 Or is Fox’s book relevant primarily to the modern Western reader
who already takes for granted the myth about the primacy of the individual
(which is the source of the double bind that Fox wants to correct yet remains
caught in)?
There are other aspects of cultural storage (tradition) that need to be taken in-
to account by any theorist who wants to bring about radical changes in human
thought and behavioral patterns. Perhaps the most important is the way in
which language encodes the metaphorical thinking of earlier people who were,
in turn, influenced by the metaphorically based schemata of still earlier people.
While philosophers, linguists, and people working in the sociology of knowl-
edge have effectively explained how we have mistakenly understood language
as either having a direct correspondence to the thing named or as a neutral
conduit through which individuals communicate their ideas and information,
it has been the work done in the area of the metaphorical nature of the lan-
guage/thought connection that has illuminated how language both stores and
reproduces a cultural group’s cognitive schemata. The recent writings of George
Lakoff, Mark Johnson, and Donald Schon, in particular, have brought out dif-
ferent characteristics of metaphorical thinking that quickly move us out of the
rarefied atmosphere of theory and into the contextualized and taken for granted
world of culture. Cultures, it seems, are based on root metaphors (or what can
also be called meta- narratives, world views, and now, paradigms—though this
term seems to be more appropriate to a Kuhnian type discussion). The root
metaphors (plural in the case of Western cultures) have changed over time; and
if we examine various periods of Western history we find that the creation myth
of the Book of Genesis served as a root metaphor that had profound influence on
subsequent cultural patterns (even on current attitudes toward human/nature
relationships), and that the machine was used as the root metaphor that framed
modern cultural developments–including our political institutions, approaches
to work, and even architecture. If we consider the root metaphors of other cul-
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tural groups, particularly traditional cultures less given to making a virtue of
syncretism, the connection between root metaphors and all the other levels of
metaphorical thinking (reflected in their art, technology, rituals, and patterns
of social interaction) stand out more clearly.
For our purposes here, it is important to stress that our primary purpose is
to clarify how metaphorical thinking works as a process of cultural storage, re-
production, and (because thought is metaphorical) re-working old patterns into
“new” (in the weakest sense of the word) ones that will be conceptually coher-
ent with the dominant root metaphor of the cultural group. To return to Fox’s
attempt to reformulate the basis of self-identity, a strong case can be made that
his arguments are an example of analogic thinking where, instead of thinking of
self as autonomous and thus as an observer of the external world (an example
of “as if” thinking) he wants to substitute a new analogue–e.g., associate self-
identity with “experiences of commonality with all that is.” Both the image of
personal identity he wants to overturn and his image of a cosmologically based
personal identity are framed by the cultural (Western) root metaphor that rep-
resents every person as possessing a sense of agency–that is, the person as the
basic social unit and as having the freedom (and thus responsibility) to choose
their own identity and destiny.
The point here is that the meta-narratives encoded in the root metaphors frame
the process of analogic thinking whereby the old schema of understanding is
mapped on to the new situations that pose the existential problem of needing
to be both understood and brought under control. On one level, the process of
analogic thinking can be seen in the process of thinking of the environment “as
like” a natural resource, the computer “as like” an artificial form of intelligence,
and deep ecology “as like” Arne Naess’ analogue of deep questioning and Murry
Bookchin’s characterization as “eco-la-la.” Analogic thinking, where the new is
understood in terms of the familiar, involves both cultural storage and extension.
In a culture such as ours, where there are competing root metaphors, analogic
thinking can also be understood as a political process where the analogues that
prevail over others (both old and new) become over time taken for granted and
encoded in iconic metaphors.
Words such as “data,” “individual,” “intelligence,” “nature,” and so forth, are
examples of iconic metaphors. The image (schema of understanding, mental
template, conceptual model) is taken for granted, even though it encodes the
schema building process worked out in an earlier and politically successful pro-
cess of analogic thinking. The encoding process also reflects the influence of
the prevailing root metaphors that frame the nature of the analogues that are
considered as appropriate. The way in which iconic metaphors like “individu-
alism,” “freedom,” “environment,” and so forth, encode the cognitive schema
worked out in earlier processes of analogic thinking creates the special problem
that Fox (or any other theorist who is challenging current ways of thinking)
has to deal with. That is, in order to establish a new iconic metaphor that
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will become a taken for granted part of public discourse he has to establish a
basis for accepting a new root metaphor that will give legitimacy to his process
of analogic thinking. It is interesting to note that he uses science as the root
metaphor that gives authority to understanding reality as “a single unfolding
reality.”
In effect, the cognitive schemata that represent the Western form of cultural
storage are a constant problem for Fox. They are both present in the words
that represent the view of reality he is against, and in his use of words that
constitute the “new basis” of understanding. This process of cultural storage
and reproduction, even when challenged by a highly reflective person like Fox, is
a reminder that the symbolic foundations of a culture both precede and remain
an integral aspect of the “individual’s” choices and ways of understanding. The
major question posed by this aspect of the human condition relates to how the
root metaphors of a cultural group can be changed. The root metaphor that
represents the individual as possessing a will (the Christian meta-narrative)
and the reworking of this root metaphor by Cartesian thinkers in a way that
strips the individual of any group (cultural and historical) identity dictate the
scenario that Fox followed so faithfully. That is, the root metaphor dictates
that a rational approach be taken to establishing a new root metaphor– even
though the root metaphor that dictates this approach was not the outcome of
a rational process, but rather of more complex forces associated with powerful
evocative experiences and mythic narratives of Western cultural groups.
The recognition that cultures are based on different root metaphors leads to
another problem not addressed by Fox; namely, that his articulation both of
the problem (human impact on ecosystems) and the solution, (transpersonal
ecology) may be understood in entirely different ways by members of other
cultures. A Hindu from India, a Muslim from Iran, and a Confucian from
rural China would each in their own way put a different interpretation on the
human/environment relationship. To take a specific example of how daunting
the cultural factor is, we can take the example of how Indo-European languages
involve the use of count nouns (which parenthetically characterizes Fox’s desire
to work out an abstract definition of the self), and how Chinese involves the
use of mass nouns. Ron and Suzanne Scollon, in interpreting Chad Hansen’s
research into the language/ontology differences that separate Chinese from Indo-
European language communities, summarize the distinction as follows:
The two crucial aspects of count nouns are that they take plural-
ization (‘a horse,”the horse’). Given the philosophical problem of
determining what is a horse, to take an example not at all at ran-
dom, to the Platonic mind no particular horse has all and only the
characteristics of ‘horseness’.
The use of pluralization and articles to frame nouns, so the argument goes,
leads to “definition by analysis, description, proto-type, observation, nihilism”–
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-where the real world is understood as examples of abstract forms. In contrast
to this epistemological orientation, with its emphasis on member and set dis-
tinctions that characterize abstract/theoretical thought, the Scollons’ (following
Hansen’s analysis) argue that “what is significant about a mass noun (which
characterize Chinese) is that matter is conceived as extended ‘stuff.’ The cru-
cial questions which arise, then, are not regarding the ideal characteristics which
define the stuff, but the boundaries between one kind of stuff and another kind
of stuff. “In other words,” conclude the Scollons, “Hansen believes that Chinese
mass nouns have given rise to an ontology of form and substance rather than
an ontology of idea and prototype.” 5 This fundamental difference in use of
count and mass nouns that separate the two language groups leads to a Chinese
ontology characterized by “definition, by example, discrimination, boundary
marking, interpretation, Taoism.” 6 Without going into how these differences
get played out in terms of how Chinese understand the human/environment
relationship (which, according to the Scollons, is profoundly different from the
Western romanticized view of Chinese people as being at home in nature) it is
sufficient to present this as an example of the challenge facing any attempt to
work out a transpersonal ecology that does not take account of differences in
cultural epistemologies.
Ideology
The connection between ideology and culture is brought out in Clifford Geertz’s
definition: “Cultural patterns-religious, philosophical, aesthetic, scientific, ideological–
are ’programs’; they provide a template or blueprint for the organization of social
and psychological processes, much as genetic systems provide such a template
for the organization of organic processes.” 7 Ideology, when understood as a
schema of understanding reproduced through a discursive formation of language,
consciousness, and social practice, brings out the more political aspects of the
symbol systems that constitute a culture. Thus, the political cannot be sepa-
rated from the exercise of power, which in its most rudimentary sense involves,
as Michel Foucault puts it, “an action upon an action...[that] structures the
possible field of actions of others.” 8 An ideology, following Foucault’s way of
understanding, is the regime of Truth used to legitimate beliefs and practices. It
also frames what will be attended to and what will not be seen, and provides the
language that aligns individual thought and action with the ideology’s mapping
of reality.
Keeping the earlier warning in mind about the multiple expression of culture,
and thus ideologies, I would like to bring into focus the ideological issues raised
by Fox’s transpersonal ecology. Arne Naess’ “Ecosophy T” will be brought into
the discussion because his more fully elaborated social/political views raise in
a more immediate way the question of alignment between writings on ecosophy
and the contending ideological traditions that have been most visible during the
period of modernization in the West. Although each tradition has had many
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mutations on the themes and assumptions of the parent ideology, it would be
safe to identify them in two distinct discourses: liberalism and conservatism.
Although both academics and the general public often introduce confusion into
political discussions by mistakingly using the term “conservative” when they
are actually referring to ideas and values that have their roots in Classical Lib-
eralism, it is essential for reasons I shall bring up later to identify the schemata
of understanding that separate these two positions.
Stephen Toulmin’s identification of modernity with the written, universal, gen-
eral, and timeless, and the pre-modern (and I would argue, post-modern) with
the oral, particular, local, and timely, is one way to represent the basic differ-
ences that separate liberal from conservative ideologies. 9 For our purposes, the
most fundamental distinctions can be framed in terms of a somewhat different
set of characteristics. If we consider the expressions of liberalism (technocratic
and emancipatory varieties that have dominated the discourse within the field
of education, and the various interpretations that have guided the use of the
state and technology to achieve social progress) a shared set of core assumptions
stand out. These include a linear view of time that has been fused with the as-
sumption that change is progressive, a view of rationality as an individualistic
activity that has as its primary purpose the demystification of embeddedness
in tradition, a view of the individual as autonomous in the sense that the re-
alization of freedom requires not being bound by responsibilities to place and
to a community of memory, and finally, it is the judgment, perspective, and
interpretation of the individual that has ultimate authority for assessing the
evidence and moral norms. In a word, liberalism emphasizes an experimental
approach to life, with the expansion of the individual’s sense of freedom and
personal meaning being the ultimate manifestation of progress.
The core beliefs of liberalism are now a taken for granted aspect of modern
consciousness, and thus treated as culture-free. They are also based on an
anthropocentric view of the world. As a schema for organizing both psychical
self-identity dimensions of everyday life, as well as the patterns that regulate
relationships and uses of technologies– to return to Geertz’s way of connecting
ideology with culture–it becomes important to raise the question of whether one
can embrace simultaneously both Fox’s formulation of a transpersonal ecology
and the core beliefs of liberalism. To put it another way, if we begin to consider
the actual cultural patterns that would be consistent with Fox’s transpersonal
ecology would it become necessary to abandon the core beliefs of liberalism?
An even broader formulation of the question would be: can the ecological crisis
also be understood as a crisis of liberal ideology? Will a sustainable form of
culture in the West require the adoption of a more conservative set of ideological
principles?
As Fox provides few clues as to the cultural patterns that would encode and
thus reproduce a life style that represents the principle of personal identification
with all life, it is necessary to turn to Arne Naess’ articulation of what he calls
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“Ecosophy T” in order to get an answer to the above questions. Several of
Naess’ statements suggest that Ecosophy T would lead to the rejection of one
of the most fundamental tenets of liberalism–the autonomy of the individual.
Writes Naess: “the identity of the individual,‘that I am something’, is developed
through interaction with a broad manifold, organic and inorganic. There is no
completely isolatable I, no isolatable social unit.” 10 And in the following
statement the self, as a distinct entity with a will and rational capacity for
self–direction, nearly disappears entirely: “the ecological outlook is developed
through an identification so deep that one’s own self is no longer delimited by
the personal ego or the organism.” 11 The articulation of the logical norms that
guide Naess’ own version of Ecosophy T frames self-realization as “the higher the
level of Self-realisation attained by anyone, the more its further increase depends
upon the Self- realisation of the other” and finally, “complete self–realisation of
anyone depends upon that of all.”12
Naess’ arguments for adjusting technological and economic practices, as well
as other patterns of community life, to the principles of ecosophy suggest that
cultural sustainability might require a conservative ideology–one that might be
called cultural/bio-conservatism in order to separate it from the anthropocentric
forms of conservatism characteristic of Western thinking since the time of Burke.
Naess’ statement, for example, that “self-reliance...is only possible within a co-
herent, local, logical, and natural community” suggests that the social practice
of ecosophy would be nearly identical with many of the cultural characteristics
of bio- regionalism. The cultural praxis of bio-regional groups, whether we are
using traditional cultures like the Hopi or the writings of contemporary advo-
cates of bio-regionalism like Gary Snyder and Peter Berg, appear to be based
on essential values and assumptions that can only be described ideologically as
conservative. But there is another dimension to Naess’ thinking that suggest a
continuing commitment the basic tenets of liberalism.
The ideological ambivalence can be seen in how he reframes the reader’s rela-
tionship with the arguments he lays before them:
We study ecophilosophy, but to approach practical situations involv-
ing ourselves, we aim to develop our own ecosophies. In this book I
introduce one ecosophy, arbitrarily called Ecosophy T. You are not
expected to agree with all of its values and paths of derivation, but
to learn the means of developing your own systems or guides, say,
Ecosophy X, Y, or Z. Saying ’your own’ does not imply that the
ecosophy is in any way an original creation by yourself. It is enough
that it is a kind of total view which you feel at home with, ’where
you philosophically belong’. Along with one’s own life, it is always
changing. 13
The statement that “you are not expected to agree...but to learn the means
for developing your own systems or guides, say, Ecosophies X, Y, or Z” (italics
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added) reflects the liberal assumption that decisions should be based on the free
choice and rational judgment of the individual. Locating the ultimate authority
for this decision within the individual would be totally inconceivable in cultures
based on pre-modern cosmologies. The templates for the “organization of social
and psychological processes” would be encoded in the language patterns used
to communicate about relationships–and they would be learned at a taken for
granted level.
The approach of Naess and Fox to the problem of how to create a new basis of
social life that will be ecologically in balance privileges the ideology of liberalism
in another way. Both rely upon rational thought and a literacy based form
of discourse–which are cultural amplifiers of a form of liberalism (particularly
a de-contextualized pattern of thinking and the privileging of the individual’
interpretation) that has contributed to the degradation of the environment.
That is, they are attempting to establish the foundations upon which a new
culture can be built. But the mixing of ideological genres has the effect of
putting Naess and Fox in a double bind where their very similar approaches
strengthen the very cultural orientations they want to replace.
As these preliminary observations suggest, the relation of ideology to a fully
developed ecosophy needs to be addressed more directly. My own sense of the
matter is that the translation of the central principles of ecosophy into practices
people can recognize and identify with will require acknowledging the cultur-
al/ideological dimensions of these principles. This, in turn, may enable us to
ground the cosmology that situates humans within the larger ecosystems of dai-
ly practice–in much the same way as Native American and other traditional
cultures worked it out. But it will involve being clearer about the ideological
traditions that are most consistent with living within the sustaining capacities
of the Earth’s ecosystems. This guiding ideology, I suspect, will turn out to have
many of the characteristics of philosophical conservatism. But it will be framed
in terms of a root metaphor that is closer to what Fox and Naess are attempting
to articulate in their more rational way. Indeed, sustainability suggests a con-
serving rather than an experimental-change oriented schema of understanding;
it also suggests the primacy of the community (expanded to include the biot-
ic community) rather than that of the autonomous individual. Lastly, it also
suggests more emphasis on oral traditions, both as a means of expanding partic-
ipatory relationships and as a means of transmitting to the next generation the
moral sense of order that has enabled the culture to exist on a sustainable basis.
These are the essential principles of conservatism, but not of the distorted form
of conservatism that, in actuality, has its roots in Classical Liberal thinking.
The question of what constitutes the most appropriate ideological framework
for addressing the cultural patterns threatening the viability of the Earth’s e-
cosystems is particularly relevant to the issues raised by Fox and Naess. The
segment of the population most likely to think seriously about the implications
of the ideas of Fox and Naess will not be, for the most part, the people who are
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already living in the kind of cultural/bio-conservative communities that Wen-
dell Berry and Gary Snyder write about. Instead, they are more likely to be
university educated and thus deeply imbued with the modern liberal mind set–
with its emphasis on the authority of theory, the progressive nature of change,
and the need to center authority in the judgment of the individual. The irony
is that many of these more politically conscious and activist people in the en-
vironmental movement are attempting to use this liberal ideology as the basis
for addressing how to live in a sustainable relationship with the rest of the
environment. The solutions, when they are not reflective of the technocratic
liberal’s penchant to use the legislative authority of the state to affect change,
serve to reinforce the core assumptions and values of the liberal ideology that
has helped to put us on our current environmentally destructive pathway. That
a form of cultural/bio-conservatism may be more suitable in the decades ahead
may become more obvious if the writings on ecosophy would contextualize theo-
ry through the use of cultural analogues–like using traditional groups who have
evolved cultural patterns that represent the “individual” as morally obligated
to respect the other patterns of life that make up an eco-system. More clarity
about the ideological principles that are compatible with living sustainable lives
may also help people bridge the gap between the highly abstract formulations
of Fox (and to a lesser extent, Naess) and everyday practices.
Semiotics
Fox’s formulation of a transpersonal ecology and Naess’ Ecosophy T help to
clarify the conceptual implications of situating the person as an integral part
of a larger whole, but whether this logocentric approach, by itself, will have
a significant influence on the course of human behavior is indeed problematic.
Without denying the importance of their respective efforts I would like to again
suggest that the most powerful leverage points for affecting change are at the
level of culture, and that while rational arguments may be an important part
of the change process, the message systems that characterize a culture play a
more significant role in constituting and sustaining people’s sense of “reality.”
Semiotics and the sociology of knowledge represent two areas of inquiry that
have evolved somewhat different vocabularies for illuminating the “reality” con-
stituting processes of culture. Because semiotics seems to provide the more
useful vocabulary for understanding the relation between sign, codes and mes-
sages, I shall frame the following discussion under its banner, even though the
language of the sociology of knowledge is more suited for addressing other as-
pects of the “reality” constituting process. By incorporating insights from the
latter I will be able to avoid the lack of cultural contextualization that the
reader encounters in the more standard treatments of semiotics, such as in Um-
berto Eco’s A Theory of Semiotics. A key insight of the sociology of knowledge
(the Alfred Schutz, Peter Berger. Thomas Luckmann stream, that is) is that
what the person experiences as “real” is constituted, sustained, and renegotiat-
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ed through the multiple forms of communication that, collectively, characterize
a culture. In effect, the person is able to think and communicate with others
as her/his intersubjective self becomes grounded in the same symbolic systems
that significant others in society take for granted. From a sociology of knowledge
perspective, there can never be an autonomous person in the sense of knowing
an unmediated world or creating her/his own self-identity. Communication,
according to the sociology of knowledge theorists, is the ongoing process that
reinforces, with occasional lapses and disruptions that create social moments of
liminality, both a self-identity and the taken for granted attitude toward the
socially acquired interpretative frameworks of understanding. Clifford Geertz’s
way of understanding culture (“the tone, character, and quality of their life,
its moral and aesthetic style and mood and their world view–the picture they
have of the sheer actuality are, their most comprehensive ideas of order”) simply
provides a more grounded texture to the more theoretical and de-contextualized
insights of the sociology of knowledge. To summarize the key insights of the
sociology of knowledge that will help frame the following discussion of semiotic-
s; (1) the person’s taken for granted sense of “reality” is socially constituted;
(2) what is “real” is dependent upon multiple pathways and patterns of com-
munication; (3) the cognitive schemas acquired through communication with
significant others become internalized as the individual’s intersubjective self;
and (4) the socially shared typifications, assumptions, and categories that pro-
vide the schemas necessary for thought and communication are also part of the
self-identity process.
With its emphasis on the constitutive role of the signifier, semiotics helps to
illuminate the communicative process in terms of the coded messages in texts.
In terms of culture, semiotics help us recognize how culture–the preparation of
a meal and the setting of a table, store windows and walkways, the design of
houses, the noises of public spaces, and so forth–communicate encoded messages
that, in turn, become meaningful to the person who has been unconsciously
educated to be open only to these particular messages. In effect semiotics help
us to recognize that communication is more complex than spoken, written, and
bodily systems. The tone of voice, color of a billboard, positioning of the body on
a television commercial, number of available ice cream flavors, patterns of forest
clear cutting, etc., are “texts” that communicate messages that are far more
complex and formative in terms of the person’s behavioral/thought patterns
than what is grasped at the level of conscious awareness. This plethora of
signifiers reproduce the cultural codes that reflect, like in the process of analogic
thinking, an earlier mental ecology with its signifiers framed by the categories
and assumptions that make up its symbolic world.
When culture is understood in terms of the multiple processes of semiosis that
help to constitute what the person experiences as real (both in terms of the
meaning of the context and self in relation to context) it becomes quite evident
that addressing the cultural aspects of the ecological crisis will require more
than the rational articulation of how to understand the identity of self as part
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of a larger process of “Self- realization.” The reader can be convinced on a
rational level that both Fox and Naess have, in their own ways, laid out con-
vincing arguments; and they can finish reading the latest State of the World
fully convinced that the evidence of changes in ecosystems indicates serious
trouble ahead. But in moving from one modality of communication, which in-
volves its own distinct system of signifiers and formative codes, to others—such
as the shopping mall, freeway, or television program– a totally different set of
messages will be encountered. Even for the person who accepts the evidence of
environmental degradation, the “reality” reinforced through the other everyday
patterns of semiosis is that of plentitude–even an excess that must be consumed
if society is to create the optimum conditions for further advances in technology.
Supermarkets, television commercials, and new car lots are “texts” organized
to communicate a sense of reality that reinforces consumerism. Aside from the
use of “green labelling” in some supermarkets there are no signifiers that might
lead to an awareness that the “products” were created through the use of tech-
nologies that further weaken the viability of the soil, put more toxins into the
environment, and further destroy old growth forests. For persons who have not
read Fox, Naess, and the Worldwatch Institute reports, and who generally re-
gard media coverage of ecological disasters as a further threat to accustomed
forms of employment, the most prevalent patterns of semiosis will help sustain
as “real” a world of abundance that requires only that the paycheck keep coming
in.
Addressing the individual/cultural aspects of the ecological crisis requires a care-
ful study of the “reality” constituted through the various modalities of semiosis,
and consideration of how to affect changes at the level of cultural communica-
tion. In effect, the reality constituting messages of the everyday world should
more accurately reflect the actual conditions of the environment. A second rea-
son for turning attention to understanding culture from a semiotic perspective is
that signifiers can be utilized to construct a world of meanings and relationships
that can lead to a major shift in the orientation of a cultural group. A study
of the Balinese, for example, indicates a culture highly developed in the areas
of art, music, dance, drama, and storytelling. J. Stephen Lansing’s film, “The
Three Worlds of the Balinese” and Clifford Geertz’s essay on “Deep Play: Notes
on the Balinese Cockfight,” to cite two examples that deal with different aspects
of their highly complex symbolic world, bring out the patterns of semiosis that
frame all the cycles of existence as moral in nature. The aesthetic richness of
their lives contrasts sharply with their lack of interest in technological inno-
vations. Unlike in our cultural settings, machines are simply not part of the
semiotic systems they encounter through touch, sight, smell, and sound. But
this lack of emphasis does not mean they are lacking in technological knowledge.
The way in which the ceremonies associated with the water temples that reg-
ulate the complex system of irrigation of the countryside, allowing for a stable
agricultural practice that has lasted for hundreds of years, suggests otherwise.
The challenge here is not to transform ourselves into a copy of the Balinese, but
Copyright 1999 Trumpeter
rather to develop the cultural patterns of semiosis that will expand our sense of
meaning and participation in a manner that does not contribute to the further
destruction of natural systems. An awareness of culture in terms of a semiotic
perspective may help us affect changes at a prereflective level of awareness and
meaning that is beyond the reach of the printed word. Thus, the real challenge
is to broaden the approach to ecosophy in a way that takes into account the
primacy of culture–in all its dimensions.
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